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Problems for Personalists
Paul R. Lundy
Personalism is not a closely defined philosophical discipline.
Occasional attempts have been made to achieve a consensus among
personahsts as to what they beheve. But their "platforms" have so
far provided no precise index to the metaphysics of personalism.
Hence any discussion, especially a critical exposition of personal
ism, is a difficult venture. The constant risk is that one should find
hunself dealing with a sport rather than the true vine. Yet it may
be fairly said that the current phase of personalistic thought in
America, exemplified in the philosophy departments of Boston
University and the University of Southern California, owes its basic
principles to the systematic work of Bowne.
I. The Problem of Metaphysics
This paper undertakes to set forth three major areas in which
personalism leaves searching questions unanswered, in metaphysics,
in the philosophy of science, and in the theological area of the dis
tinction between the natural and the supernatural.
Bowne constructed his metaphysics from two ideas and a con
clusion. The two ideas were (1) that only that which acts exists
and (2) that substance, since it is by definition non-active, is non
existent. His conclusion was longer. The problem of change and
identity demands an abiding, enduring reference for the flux of
continual becoming in order that, from the fading panoply, organ
ization sufiicient for experience be achieved. Were there no factor
providing for permanence, no conscious experience would be pos
sible. The uncomprehending commg and going of discrete, com
pletely unrelated items would be the result. Only as there is an
abiding something to bridge from one item to the next can there be
the sort of cumulative acquisition which we term knowledge or ex
perience. Bowne found this need met only in the fundamental
nature of personal self-consciousness. Hence, though things are
merely phenomenal, persons are real.
Now if it be true that the natural order is merely a system of
qualities, how can certain vital metaphysical distinctions be main
tained? How shall we achieve any of the distmctions proper to the
various levels of nature? For example, how shall one differentiate
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the hving from the non-hving? The barest distinction between the
organic and inorganic requires that the organic sustam something
of its past as it proceeds to its future. But this is what qualities
cannot do. The issue attendmg a phenomenalistic interpretation of
experience is that, with the rejection of substance, there necessarily
follows the denial of essence and causation. Bereft of these, nature
is without dimension and can have no history, for there is nothmg
enduring. Thus, the mmimal conceptual needs of biology cannot be
met. The predisposition of a thmg to develop or to be modified in
one way rather than another and the capacity of a thmg to yield
present evidence of past influence are impossible notions for phe
nomenalism. If the cosmos is but a rootless surface of qualities,
then history is lost in its own making, it dies as it is bom. History
is possible only if there is something objectively enduring in nature.
And the distinction between life and non-life is meaningful only as
history is a material reality.
It was Bowne's conviction that the universe did not come to
its full meaning except in the consciousness of persons. (How he
could know that nature was thus wanting, since he knew nothing of
things-in-themselves, is a mystery.) By this he meant that the ob
jective order was not an order except as it was organized by per
sonal self-consciousness. That is, the hierarchy of the sciences, with
their supposed reference to the essential gradation of nature, is sub
jective. But, as was shown above, this will not do. Brightman no
ticed the problem as early as 1921.^ Cranston has also shown that
a major endeavor of contemporary personalism is to meet this in
adequacy in one way or another. ^ The inherent weakness of person
alism in treating of the metaphysical status and function of nature
tends always to drive it to absolute idealism (panpsychism) or to
reaUsra (occasionalism). Phenomenalism, to date, is not an ade
quate metaphysical basis for common experience. It ends in a ver
sion of positivism which has, in secular quarters, long since been
given up.
The attempt to round out the phenomenalistic account leads
consistently away from the metaphysics implicit in evangelical the
ology. Thus, Bowne's students have defended much that he denied.
1 Edgar S. Brightman, "The Tasks Confronting a Personalistic Philoso
phy," Personalist, Vol. II (October, 1921), pp. 257-258.
2 Mildred Welch Cranston, "Tensions Within Personalism," The Philo
sophical Forum, Vol. IV (Spring 1946), pp. 23-25.
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Bertocci has frankly affirmed that "Personalism is pantheistic so far
as the world is concerned, for it holds that Nature is God's energiz-
ing."3 After all if, as personahsm claims, the only reality is personal
then nature, if it has any metaphysical status whatever, must be
personal. This is merely to go back, as Bowne should have more
consistently done, to Berkeley's doctrme of "esse est percipi."
Nothing in the phenomenahstic scheme can stand exempt from this
rule. It matters not at all�and here is the difference between
Berkeley's and Bowne's msight�that the reahn of nature be con
sidered objective to finite persons. Bowne insisted that he was in
some sense a realist because he regarded the order of qualities as
external. It was something found, not made. But this does not al
leviate in any degree the threat of pantheism, for though nature be
altogether objective to finite persons it is nevertheless a feature of
some personal experience, if not ours, then God's. This is to say
that if nature does not exist in its own right as a metaphysical reality
it cannot exist, on personalistic grounds, except as it shares in the
nature or experience of some person. Bowne's adherence to objec
tivism rules out the possibility of identifying nature with finite
persons; hence, it must be identified with God.
II. The Problem of a Philosophy of Science
Phenomenahsm is a surface philosophy, satisfied that the na
ture of the thing-in-itself, if there be such, is beyond our grasp.
Substance is an illegitimate notion of uncritical thought and the
causal relation is not found in experience. This was Hume's famous
discovery. Restricting experience by definition to our straight
forward interplay with the external order of qualities removes any
hope for realism. What happens to science in this context is ade
quately expressed in Humean skepticism and in the successive va
rieties of positivism which have stemmed from the phenomenahstic
tradition. Moreover, though it is true that Bowne was in complete
disagreement with Hume on certain issues, he is nevertheless impli
cated in much that Hume was able to show as resultmg from his
own denial of substance and causation.
What Hume found was that his doctrine necessitated the strict
est uncertainty as to the future. After all, if one cannot get beneath
the phenomenal thing to its fundamental nature, there is no know-
3 Peter A. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God in Late British
Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 115-116.
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ing its necessary deportment. Indeed, there is no knowing whether
it has a necessary Ime of behavior at aU. If the essential nature of
a thing cannot be grasped, there is no providmg for it a lunitmg
definition. This means that, if from our knowledge of the past we
do not and cannot penetrate to the unambiguous, hard core of
reality, we can never have certain knowledge regarding the future.
Thus the strictest science ends in mere probabihty. Experience
knows only that a thing is now colored, figured, textured, etc., and
that these qualities, sometimes modified, sometimes not, succes
sively appear through the intervals of perception. The modification
or its opposite merely happens and there is no possibility of ex
plaining these phenomena. Thus, one state of a thing, however
exceptional, is as appropriate as any other. There is no arbitrating
between conflicting states of qualities (e.g., mirage versus undis-
torted image) in order to learn which is expressive of the true
nature of the thing. Qualities simply are what they are. They refer
to nothing beyond themselves or, if they do, we cannot infer that
reference. The conclusion is that the laws of science are not regu
lative in nature. Rather they are, in one way or another, conveni
ences or conventions of the mind in its handling of experience. (It
is here that the most radical doctrines, e.g., positivism, pragmatism,
operationalism, etc., appear.) Then, if there be no regulative
scheme that we can discover in nature, there is no telling what the
next moment might produce. Perhaps cuckoo eggs will stand forth
and expound metaphysics. Any absurdity whatever is just as pos
sible as the uniformity we have come to know.
Bowne, at this point, forsook the strict phenomenahsm of
British empiricism and for a very good reason. He realized that the
quahties of things can never reveal their true nature.^ He was aware
of the predicament of Humean phenomenalism and sought to avoid
it. It is not that he differed m his doctrine of ontology from that of
phenomenalism generally. He was committed to the notion that
there is no existence of any kmd underlymg quahties. But he tried
so to arrange his premises as to reach a different conclusion. What
he suggested was that though we know only qualities we can never
theless perceive a thing's true nature from the law of its activity.^
This was Bowne's philosophy of science.
4 Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1882),pp. 61ff.
5 Ibid., pp. 59ff.
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He believed science to be the passive Baconian disciphne of
cataloging data. One observes and records and this is science, the
limit of our knowledge of nature. Seemingly this is adequate as a
definition of science�is it not true that our only knowledge of a
thing is gained by the empirical encounter, observation of a thing's
activity through the various phases of its career until we have dis
covered the laws of its behavior?�yet actually its madequacy is
well known. No later than Galileo it was found that science is not a
spectator disciplme. Data, by themselves, do not constitute science.
Data must be understood, intellectualized, if systematic advance
beyond sheer fact is made possible. Every modification of nature
proceeds upon discernment that the desired modification is within
the possible range of a thing's nature. Otherwise science would be
a blind swinging in the dark hoping to hit upon some fortunate
combination of events so as to produce a desired end. Science is
more than the recording of the states of a thing as it proceeds
through its own history.
Bowne glimpsed the difiiculty attending his definition. He
realized that certainty, for this sort of science, is possible only in
the presence of an exhaustive knowledge of a thing's actual and
possible history.*^ This is a manifest impossibility. Bowne should
have further reahzed that it amounted to a total upset of his de
scription of science. More especially he ought to have understood
that if the law of a thing's activity is identical with its true nature
or essence and that if this law or essence is found only in exhaustive
knowledge of the thing then he had no basis for real knowledge of
nature at all. He has not superseded Hume. Skepticism and proba
bility are his inevitable companions.
III. The Problem of the Natural-Supernatural
Distinction
Phenomenalism�and personalism is merely a version of phe
nomenalism�is doomed in the area of metaphysics by its chosen
limitations to the state in which Hume left it. Now a pertinent and
crucial theological question must be raised. If experience yields
nothing but qualities and if these have no necessary connection or
require exhaustive knowledge in order to be known, then every
successive or new state of a thing is as native to the thing as any
other. No one state is more natural than any other. Each is to be
7 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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either accepted as a valid member of the passing parade (Hume) or
subsumed, together with aU other contributing data, under the un
finished history of the thing (Bowne). In either case there is no
point in the development of science where one may stop and con
tent hunself with the assurance that he knows the real nature of the
objects of experience. But if one cannot know their true nature,
what is natural to them, neither can he know what is non-natural.
He cannot know miracle!
Miracle is not merely a departure from the norm of a thing's
behavior. It is not simply a radical sample. Miracle is the non-
natural, a contradiction of nature which, without the back-drop of
the causal relation, would be indistinguishable. It is no extrava
gance to claim that within the frame-work of phenomenalism,
whether Bowne's variety or other, miracle is meaningless.
The very notion of miracle is peculiarly demanding in the
realm of metaphysics. If it is to survive the systematic interpretation
of experience then that interpretation must furnish certain minimal
requirements. On the side of ontology there must be provided a
real uniformity in nature. And that uniformity must be objectively
real and necessary, not merely logical. The restrictive, limiting,
necessary relations proper to the causal principle must be resident
in the structure of things. On the side of epistemology there must
be provision for such rapport between subject and object as to
permit knowledge of the true nature of the object. And this knowl
edge must amount, in terms of scientific disciphne with its finite
limitations of time and place, to virtual prediction, not to mere
possibihty or probability. Only if these requirements are met can
miracle have significance. Personahsm does not furnish the desig
nated minimum.
It is strange indeed that upon the very principles which pro
vided the foundation for the most extreme forms of naturalism and
skepticism should be erected a venture into Christian metaphysics.
Bowne was a Christian. His tradition has been carried on by men
of like conviction. But commendable as this is it does not eclipse
the philosophical short-commgs and, more, the theological perils of
Bowne's formulation. Before the turn of the century, his work was
under suspicion; discerning persons sensed the dkection in which
his system would lead. Since that tune the imphcations of his
thought have reached fuU flower. This unfoldmg has been m the
form of a long display of the endemic radicalism of personahsm.
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This system has nevertheless been attractive to many who
reject the liberalism which Bowne helped to shape. It has claimed
the distinction of being the major contemporary protest against
naturalism. This claim has yielded a measure of prestige which
seems hardly justifiable, in view of the fact that the consistent trend
of personalism has been away from Christian supematuralism.
